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MORE SPEECH, LESS LITIGATION: EXTENDING
THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE
TO THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
In our increasingly litigious society, individuals and corporations frequently file defamation suits in response to statements concerning their persons.' The effect of this tendency to sue operates
to chill the first amendment right of citizens to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 2 Because the cost and inconvenience of defending a defamation suit is overwhelming, 3 many
citizens are deterred from lodging good faith petitions at the town
meeting, 4 to their congressional representatives, 5 and to the President of the United States.6 This conduct ultimately cripples the
7
ability of a representative government to govern democratically.
Due to the apparent inadequacies of the current laws of defamation, some courts have turned to the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine
1. See Bio/Basics Int'l Corp. v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 545 F. Supp.
1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (plaintiff responded to testimony before Senate subcommittee by commencing a defamation suit); Bass v. Rohr, 57 Md. App. 609, 471
A.2d 752 (Md. 1984) (complaint made to Home Improvement Committee responded to by defamation suit).
2. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 34 (W. Va. 1981). The first amendment
provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Fees for defending a defamation suit were as high as $74,000 in 1980.
Smith, The Rising Tide of Libel Litigation.: Implications of the Gertz Negligence Rule, 44 MoNT. L. REv. 71, 87 (1983) (fees required for defending libel
litigation can be astronomical). Even the dissent in Webb recognized the chilling effect of defending a defamation lawsuit. Justice Neely stated that while
the plaintiff could spend unlimited amounts on excellent legal advice, the defendants were hard pressed to hire counsel at all. "The potential for chilling
legitimate first amendment rights where there is anything less than absolute
immunity is awe inspiring." Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 46 (W. Va. 1981)
(Neely, J., dissenting).
4. See Sherrard v. Hull, 460 A.2d 601 (Md.) (per curiam), affg 53 Md. App.
553, 456 A.2d 59 (1983).
5. See Bio/Basics Int'l Corp. v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 545 F. Supp.
1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
6. See Smith v. McDonald, 737 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert granted, 105 S.Ct.
502 (1984).
7. Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127, 139 (1961).
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to preserve the petitioning process.8 Although originally designed
to safeguard a person's freedom to exercise his right to petition
from the fear of an antitrust sanction,9 the doctrine now applies in
other areas of the law. Courts have used the doctrine to protect the
petitioning process from a wide range of civil sanctions'0 which
might otherwise inhibit a person's freedom to petition the government for a redress of grievances." The doctrine's application to the
law of defamation, however, remains uncertain.
The purpose of this comment is to question the ability of the
law of defamation to safeguard a person's access to the petitioning
process. This comment advocates the extension of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to the law of defamation. Like Noerr-Pennington
in antitrust law, Noerr-Penningtonin the law of defamation will act
to safeguard the constitutional right to petition, and will conse12
quently further protect our system of representative government.
8. See, e.g., Sherrard v. Hull, 460 A.2d 601 (Md.) (per curiam), affg 53 Md.
App. 553, 456 A.2d 59 (1983). The term Noerr-Pennington is a combination of
two Supreme Court cases: Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965).
9. The law of antitrust forbids the creation of monopolies and efforts by
individuals or groups to restrain trade. Eastern R.R. President's Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961). Section 1 of the Sherman
Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy" in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). One court interpreted
the Sherman Act as a "comprehensive character of economic liberty aimed at
preserving free and unfettered competition as a rule of trade." Northern Pac.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). Any construction of the Sherman
Act, however, does not prohibit two or more persons from attempting to persuade government to take action with respect to laws. Eastern RR President's
Conference, 365 U.S. at 135.
10. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983) (suit
for unfair labor practices arising from the filing of a lawsuit); Gorman Towers,
Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) (civil rights action concerning a
petitioner's attempt to change city zoning); Stern v. United States Gympsum,
Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1977) (absolute immunity from a suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1985 (1) for sending a complaint to an Internal Revenue Service agent
with knowledge of its falsity), cert denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1978); Sawmill Products, Inc. v. Town of Cicero, 477 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (protest of a sawmill shutdown by city ordinance); Wiess v. Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F.
Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (lobbying to oppose zoning permits); Aknin v. Phillips, 404 F. Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (tortious business interference litigation
from an urging of public officials), oqffd, 538 F.2d 307 (1976); Bass v. Rohr, 57
Md. App. 609, 471 A.2d 752 (Md. 1984) (defamation action from home owner's
complaint); Webb. v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981) (defamation litigation
arising from a petition concerning water pollution by surface coal mining); People v. Gottfried, 64 Misc. 2d 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y. Crim. 1970) (doctrine
immunized criminal charges stemming from a petition).
11. Sherrard v. Hull, 53 Md. App. 553, 567,456 A.2d 59, 67 (1983). Cf. Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.) (no absolute immunity to section
1985(1) actions), cert denied, at 105 S.Ct. 105 (1983).
12. See generally Sherrard,53 Md. App. at 553, 456 A.2d at 59 (the right to
petition is a necessary element of our representative democracy). The first
amendment right to petition is not a right which our forefathers always ex-
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Whether the restriction takes the form of an antitrust suit or a defamation suit, the restraint on the right to petition remains the
13
same.
The first segment of this comment reviews the United States
Supreme Court's development of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
and its association to the first amendment right to petition. 14 The
second segment analyzes the current law of defamation. It concentrates on the New York Times standard of malice and explains why
this standard is insufficient to adequately safeguard a person's freedom to exercise his right to petition. 15 Third, this comment discusses the common law absolute privilege afforded legislative and
judicial proceedings,' 6 and the problem of statements published
outside the governmental arena. 17 This privilege parallels the
evolution of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine; yet, each of the concepts have individual and distinct scopes which require discussion.
The final segment sets forth a proposal designed to ensure that the
right to petition remains uninhibited through the extension of the
Noerr-Penningtondoctrine to the law of defamation. 18 This extension will provide society with the benefits of a collective conscience
by guaranteeing the free exchange of ideas,19 thus leading to a
healthy and knowledgeable democratic government.
pected to be used in a wise or useful manner, but the forefathers knew of no
other way by which free men could conduct a democracy. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring).
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the right to petition
would be but a hollow promise if allowed to be eroded by indirect restraint.
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Illinois St. Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
The right to petition is a right which should not be lightly subjected to restraint.
Schneider v. imith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968). Where exposed to the air of autocracy, the right to petition, despite its theoretical strength as a component of a
democratic government, demonstrates remarkable fragility. Stern v. United
States Gympsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1346 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
975 (1978).
13. Cf. Sherrard,53 Md. App. at 569, 456 A.2d at 67 (economic harm caused
by antitrust is as devastating as damage to one's reputation by defamation, thus,
extension is a logical one).
14. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's development of Noerr-Pennington, see infra notes 20-60 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the inadequacy of the New York Times standard of
malice, see infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the common law privileges, see infra notes 94-110
and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the problem of statements published outside the governmental arena, see infra notes 111-124 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the extension of Noerr-Penningtonto the law of defamation, see infra notes 125-150 and accompanying text.
19. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 43 (W. Va. 1981).
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ORIGINS OF THE Noerr-PenningtonDOCTRINE
20
The United States Supreme Court, in a trilogy of decisions,
recognized the need to safeguard a person's right to petition from

the effect of subsequent antitrust sanctions. The first of these, East21
ern RailroadPresident's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,Inc.,

involved a coalition of trucking companies that brought an antitrust
action against the railroad industry. The coalition claimed that a

railroad campaign, designed to sway public sentiment against the
trucking industry and to influence the passage and enforcement of
laws, violated the Sherman Act. The campaign was so successful
that it persuaded the Governor of Pennsylvania to veto a bill in22
tended to assist the trucking industry.
The Supreme Court held that political efforts designed to muster public opinion and influence governmental decisionmaking did
not constitute a violation of antitrust laws. 2 3 The Court stated that
an interpretation of the Sherman Act forbidding an attempt to influence governmental action would substantially impair the legislature's power to govern. 24 In any representative democracy the
branches of government act on behalf of the people. This democracy depends, to a very large extent, on the ability of the people to
communicate with the government. 25 The Court emphasized that
"[t]he right to petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill
of Rights, and we cannot ... lightly impute to Congress an intent
26
to invade these freedoms."
In Noerr, the Court conceded that some of the railroads' peti20. See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508
(1972); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1964); Eastern
R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
21. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
22. Id. at 130. The "Fair Truck Bill" would have permitted heavier trucking loads upon Pennsylvania roads. Id. The court noted that the genuineness of
the petitioner's activity was evidenced by its successfulness. Id. at 144. Successful lobbying efforts indicate that a genuine effort to influence governmental
action existed. Metro Cable Co. v. C.A.T.V. of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th
Cir. 1975).
23. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136.
24. Id. at 137. To hold that the government may take actions to cease restraints of trade, but at the same time state that people may not inform the
government about such activity, would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to
regulate political activity. This purpose has no basis in the legislative history of
the Act. Id. There is legislative history which supports Noerr. During the debate over the Sherman Act, Senator Sherman stated that the Act "does not
interfere in the slightest degree with voluntary associations made to affect the
public opinion to advance the interests of a particular trade or association." 21
CONG. REC. 2562 (1890), quoted in Coastal State Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d
1358, 1364 n.21 (5th Cir. 1983).
25. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137.
26. Id. at 138.
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tioning activity involved unethical conduct. 27 The unethical conduct, however, was secondary to an otherwise legitimate effort to
influence governmental decisionmaking. 28 The Court noted that as
an incidental effect of all genuine petitioning activity, another's interests might be harmed. The imposition of a civil sanction, moreover, would necessarily render all genuine petitioning activity
void. 29 Thus, to hold otherwise would be an invasion of the political
30
process.
The Court did acknowledge, nevertheless, that certain petitioning activity would not be immune from the laws of antitrust. In
Noerr, a reference was made to what would later develop into the
"sham" exception. 31 The Court declared that there may be instances where petitioning activity is nothing more than a sham to
cover an attempt to directly harm the business practice of a competitor.32 Although the Court failed to elaborate on what would constitute a sham, it did immunize in Noerr such unethical conduct as
fraudulent misrepresentation and malicious behavior. 33 The conduct in Noerr was absolutely immune from civil sanction because it
was secondary to an otherwise "genuine" effort to sway public sentiment and influence governmental action.
Ultimately, the Court stressed that its decision restored the
"true nature of the case-a no- 'holds barred fight' between two industries both of which are seeking control of a profitable source of
27. Id. at 143. The unethical conduct consisted primarily of malicious con-

duct and fraudulent statements published in various publications. Generally,
the statements alleged that the trucking industry constantly violated the laws
and created many traffic hazards. The statements also urged the truckers to
pay their share of road rebuilding costs and to obey the laws. Id. See Webb v.
Fury, 282 S.E.2d at 40 (W. Va. 1981) (court cited Noerr as authority for the proposition that Noerr-Pennington provides immunity

against defamation

litigation).
28. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 143. The Sherman Act's code of ethics condemns
trade restraints, not political activity. A public campaign designed to influence
governmental action clearly falls within the category of political activity. Id. at
140-41. Lobbying and other joint efforts by individuals to obtain legislative action is protected by the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine against the law of antitrust.
Westborough Mall v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 746 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983). Noerr-Penningtonprotects not only direct solicitation

to government, but also public campaigns designed to sway public opinion.
State v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1314 (8th Cir.) (petitioning for boycott), cert denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
29. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 143-44. See also Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682 (Utah
1982) (the first amendment protects genuine petitions even if the incidental effect of the petition is injury to another); Reid v. Delorme, 2 S.C.L. 76 (Brev.
1806) (every citizen has a right to petition government even though such petition might wound a reputation).

30.
31.
32.
33.

Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id. at 142.
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income." 34 These political struggles, common in the halls of legislative bodies, inherently involve the possibility, even the probability,
that one party will be hurt by the statements of another. 35 The
Court reasoned that regardless of the reprehensible conduct in No36
err, an antitrust sanction was not the solution.
The second relevant Supreme Court decision, United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington,3 7 modified the Noerr rule by
extending absolute immunity to petitioning activity addressed to
executive officials. The Court reaffirmed that genuine petitioning
activity, intended to influence the passage and enforcement of laws,
was immune from antitrust sanction.3 8 The immunity applied regardless of any anti-competitive intent on the part of the
39
petitioner.
It was not until the third relevant Supreme Court case that the
Court had an opportunity to exclude petitioning activity from Noerr-Pennington immunity. In California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited,40 the Court explicitly based Noerr-Pennington immunity on the first amendment right to petition. In Noerr and Pennington,the doctrine was limited to an interpretation of
the Sherman Act. In California Motor, however, the Court asserted that it would be destructive to the right to petition if petitioners could not, without violating antitrust laws, use the channels
34. Id. at 144. The Court noted that it appeared that both groups utilized all
their political powers in order to influence the passage of laws which would
either help them or injure the other. The contest was conducted along lines
normally expected in the arena of politics except for the deliberate deception of
the public and of public officials. Id. at 145.
35. Id. at 144.
36. Id. at 145.
37. 381 U.S. 657 (1964). In Pennington,it was alleged that petitioning activity directed at the Secretary of Labor, and designed to obtain adjustments in the
coal purchasing policies of the Tennessee Valley Authority, violated antitrust
laws. It was further alleged that the intent of the petitioning activity was to
drive small coal companies out of business. Id.
38. Id. at 670. The Court stated that even though the petitioner may have
intended to eliminate all competition, genuine efforts to influence public officials do not violate antitrust laws. This intent is not illegal, either standing
alone or as part of a broader scheme. Id.
39. Id. One court which considered the plaintiff's anticompetitive purpose
stated that even though the plaintiff hoped the cost of the suit would "break"
the back of its competitor, the petition was immune from prosecution because it
was otherwise genuine. Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173,
1200 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983). See also Stern v. United
States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1977) (motive is irrelevant even
though the petitioner may be pleased at the prospect of injury), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 975 (1978); Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (a malicious motive is of no relevance). Communications are absolutely protected, regardless of motive or intent, because greater mischief may result by permitting
motive to be enclosed than from wholly rejecting it. Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S.
311, 315 (1884).
40. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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and procedures of government to advocate their causes and points
of view. 4 1 Although the CaliforniaMotor Court held that efforts to
influence governmental action were guaranteed by the first amendment, it restated the conviction that not all petitioning activity was
protected by Noerr-Pennington.42
In California Motor, the defendant set up a trust fund to finance opposition to all applications submitted by the plaintiffs to a
regulatory commission. The applications were subject to commission approval and required by the plaintiffs to participate in the
trucking industry. Each application was challenged by the initiation of state and federal judicial proceedings. 43 The defendant also
obtained rehearings, reviews, and appeals from commission and
court decisions in order to further delay the efficient business operations of the plaintiffs. 44 The Court found the defendant guilty of
antitrust violations. 45 The Court held that the activity of the defendant was not legitimately designed to influence governmental
action, but was a sham petition intended to directly harm the plaintiffs. 46 This harm was accomplished by deliberately denying the

plaintiffs the right to free and unlimited access to the regulatory
process through concerted manipulation of the adjudicatory process. 47 The defendant was identified, therefore, as a regulator of
41. Id. at 510-11.
42. Id. at 513.
43. Id. at 509.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 513.
46. Id. In CaliforniaMotor the petitioning activity was directed at the judicial branch. The plaintiffs argued that certain unethical conduct, like fraudulent misrepresentation, which might otherwise be condoned in the legislative
arena, cannot seek refuge under the umbrella of politics when directed at the
judicial branch. Id. One court has stated that petitioning abuse should indeed
receive more scrutiny when outside the legislative forum. Forro Precision, Inc.
v. International Business Machines Corp., 673 F.2d 1045, 1059 n.10 (9th Cir.
1982). See also Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (scope of
immunity depends on degree of political discretion exercised by the governmental body), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Stewart stated that Noerr had
been trampled upon and that CaliforniaMotor hindered the right to petition.
404 U.S. at 516 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). For a discussion of the California Motor opinion, see Crawford & Tschoepe, The Erosion of the Noerr Pennington Immunity, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 291 (1981) (legislative and executive
areas remain only defined by Noerr); Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts
to Influence Governmental Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pen.
nington Doctrine,45 U. CHI. L. REv. 80, 88 (1977) (it is doubtful that Noerr was
limited by CaliforniaMotor).
47. CaliforniaMotor, 404 U.S. at 513. Petitioning activity which prevents a
party from participating in the process is not petitioning activity protected by
Noerr-Pennington,and therefore is open to a defamation action. Webb v. Fury,
282 S.E.2d 28, 39 (W. Va. 1981) (defendants did not thwart the plaintiffs access to
the governmental process). The denial of access to the governmental process is
not the only abuse which causes the immunity of Noerr-Pennington to be revoked. See Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagan Real Estate, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1124
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48
the governmental process itself.

The Sham Exception

The sham exception has been recognized by lower courts as petitioning activity that involves governmental contacts which are not
genuine attempts to influence governmental action, but merely attempts to injure others through the deliberate abuse of the governmental process. 49 It is a corruption of the petitioning process, 5° a
subversion of its integrity,5 ' and an alteration of the impartial functioning of government. 52 Examples of sham activity include bribery,5 3 threats upon governmental officials, 54 and bought votes. 55 A
sham includes a conspiracy with a licensing authority,56 and the de57
liberate filing of a false forecast solely to eliminate a competitor.
It has also included a purposeful dissemination of information to a
(N.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978).

Access barring is not intended to limit the "sham" exception to cases where
access is barred, but is intended to be synonymous with abuse of process in a
general sense. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 365, 380 (1973).
48. CaliforniaMotor, 404 U.S. at 511.
49. United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1362
(D.D.C. 1981). It is a ruse, not an attempt to genuinely seek favorable governmental action. Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643, 651 (7th Cir.
1983). See also Forro Precision, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp.,

673 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1982) (activity which serves no useful purpose other than
an attempt to directly harm another). For a broad discussion of the "sham"
exception, see Balmer, Sham Litigationand the Antitrust Laws, 29

BUFFALO

L.

REv. 39 (1980).
50. Semke v. Enid Automobile Dealers Ass'n., 456 F.2d 1361, 1366 (10th Cir.
1972).
51. Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
52. United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1362
(D.D.C. 1981).
53. Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson and Sons, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965)
(bribery of a purchasing agent), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
54. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25
(1st Cir.) (threats on an official hardly rise to the dignity of a legitimate petition
to government), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). One court has declared that
there is little reason to extend Noerr-Penningtonimmunity to a baseless communication which includes threats and other coercive measures. Sacramento
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 150, 440
F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.) (defendant unions influenced officials by means of
threats and intimidation), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971).
55. See Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980)
(failure to allege abuse of process by activity such as buying of votes).
56. See California.Motor,404 U.S. at 508. CaliforniaMotor consisted of petitioning activity which denied the plaintiffs' meaningful and unlimited access
to the administrative process. The abuse was a result of "baseless and repetitive" claims brought against the plaintiff. Id, See also Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1972) (the hallmark of a sham is the baseless and
repetitive lawsuit).
57. See Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438
F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) (filing of false forecast to administrative agency solely
to reduce competition), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
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police officer solely to harass an individual and achieve other ends
not related to law enforcement. 5s A sham is also manifested by the
filing of a knowingly frivolous lawsuit.59 In sum, a sham does not
involve a bona fide grievance, but rather involves a baseless abuse
of the petitioning process.se
Defamation and the Sham Exception
In Sherrard v. Hull,6 ' an allegedly defamatory statement communicated to the government did not constitute a sham. The statement was made within an otherwise legitimate petition, the
principal purpose of which was obtaining favorable governmental
action. The court held that because the injury to the plaintiff was
incidental to a genuine petitioning activity, no defamation action
would lie for the exercise of the defendant's right to petition. 62 The
petition itself was not based on intentional falsehoods. 63 This court,
like the Noerr Court, provided the defendant with an absolute immunity. It argued that the extension of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine from antitrust to defamation law was logical because the harm
to the right to petition is as chilling in defamation cases as in anti4
trust cases.6
THE LAw OF DEFAMATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO

PETITION

The Supreme Court decided New York 'times v. Sullivan65
with a firm belief in the national principle of robust, uninhibited
58. See Forro Precision, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 673
F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendant had a legitimate reason for going to the
police).
59. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983) (baseless litigation is not immunized by the first amendment right to petition). In
Bill Johnson's, the United States Supreme Court analogized baseless litigation
to the "sham" exception and implicitly extended the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to the' National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 734-44. The court, however,
did not use the term Noerr-Pennington. Instead the court used only the first
amendment itself. Id. at 741-44.
The Bill Johnson'sdecision should set to rest the contention that only repetitive claims will constitute a sham. See Central Bank of Clayton v. Clayton
Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (only repetitive claims meet sham exception), qffd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Rush-Hampton Indus., Inc. v. Home Ventilation, Inst., 419 F. Supp. 19 (M.D. Fla. 1976)
(repetitive claims only).
60. Bill Johnson'sRestaurants,461 U.S. at 743 (quoting Balmer, supra note
49, at 60).
61. 53 Md. App. 553, 456 A.2d 59, affd, 296 Md. 189, 460 A.2d 601 (1983).
62. Id. at 573, 456 A.2d at 71.
63. Balmer, supra note 49, at 60, quoted in, Bill Johnson's Restaurants,461
U.S. at 743.
64. Sherrard,53 Md. App. at 572, 456 A.2d at 70.
65. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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debate over public issues.66 The Court recognized the need to protect the constitutional freedoms of speech and press from the restrictive nature of the common law rules of defamation. In New
York Times, the Court held that a statement concerning either a
public official or a public figure could only be libelous if the statement was made with actual malice. 67 The Court defined malice as a
knowledge of falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth.68 The
Court reasoned that this heightened defamation standard better secured the "breathing space" necessary to safeguard the freedoms of
expression. 69 Although it allowed occasional published untruths to
escape liability, the heightened standard allowed true statements to
flow more easily.
The New York Times standard of malice has been applied in
cases involving governmental petitioning activity. In Arlington
Heights National Bank v. Arlington Heights Federal Savings and

Loan,70 for instance, the Illinois Supreme Court held that because
the freedom of speech is subject to a conditional standard of malice,
the right to petition should similarly be subject to the same standard of malice. 71 The court stated that it was not coincidental that
the freedoms of speech and press were coupled in the first amendment with the right to petition the government for a redress of
grievances. 72 The interests safeguarded by the right to petition
were deemed no more significant than those advanced by the free73
doms of speech and press.
66. Id. at 270.
67. Id. at 283.
68. Id. The term "actual malice" in New York Times is not to be mistaken
with common malice which simply means ill will or improper motive. Malice,
in this context, denotes an intent to lie. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 113 (5th ed. 1984).
69. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272.
70. 37 Ill. 2d 349, 229 N.E.2d 514 (1967).
71. Id. at 351, 229 N.E.2d at 517. Arlington Heights dealt with a petition by a
citizen to his local legislature. The court stated that, although it was mindful
that the right to petition was zealously safeguarded by the courts, it would follow the precedent of New York Times and apply a malice standard to the right
to petition. Id. But see Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981) (declined to
follow Arlington Heights because Noerr held intent not germane to petitioning
activity).
72. Arlington Heights, 37 Ill. 2d at 350, 229 N.E.2d at 517.
73. Smith v. McDonald, 562 F. Supp. 829, 840 (M.D.N.C. 1983), affd, 737
F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert granted,105 S.Ct. 502 (1984). The Smith court declined
to extend Noerr-Penningtonto the law of defamation. It contended that the
doctrine did not protect petitioning activity by way of the first amendment right
to petition, but that it only protected the right from a construction of the Sherman Act. Id. at 841. The court also relied on a pre-Noerr-Penningtondecision:
White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845). In White, the court did not decide on constitutional grounds, but on the common law, that a letter sent to the
President and the Secretary of State, containing defamatory statements about
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Other courts have held, however, that the right to petition the
government requires more protection than the New York Times
conditional standard of malice.74 The argument advanced is that
the right to petition has a spirit and scope independent of the freedom of speech. 75 The right to petition is a narrower form of speech
which involves communications designed to influence governmental decisionmaking.7 6 The freedom of speech clause involves communications made by one individual to another, whereas the right
to petition involves communications between individuals and government. 77 The role of government formed the basis on which
these courts extended absolute immunity to the petitioning process.7 8 These courts reasoned that the need of a representative government to receive information enabling it to govern more
79
democratically outweighed the potential harm of defamation.
the fitness of a governmental official, was subject to a conditional privilege. Id.
at 290-91.
The White case, however, was decided prior to New York Times v. Sullivan. Before New York Times was decided in 1964, no defamatory speech was
considered protected by the first amendment. The common law privilege was
also constrained mostly to the judicial forum. See Veeder, Absolute Immunity
in Defamation: JudicialProceedings,9 COLUM. L. REv. 463 (1909). The reliability of the statement of the common law in White has itself been questioned.
See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 332 n.12 (1983).
74. See Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir.) (because malice is so easily plead, it necessarily chills the first amendment right to
petition), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977); Bass v. Rohr, 57 Md. App. 609, 471
A.2d 752 (1984) (despite the fact that the petitioner may have acted unfairly or
maliciously will not defeat the privilege); Sherrard v. Hull, 53 Md. App. 553, 456
A.2d 59 (the more recent cases favor a rejection of the New York Times standard of malice in petition cases), affd, 296 Md. 189, 460 A.2d 601 (1983).
75. City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d 527, 531, 645 P.2d 137, 141, 183
Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (1982), vacated, 459 U.S. 1095, on remand, 33 Cal. 3d 727, 661
P.2d 1072, 190 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1983) (prior opinion reiterated entirely). Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (no clause in the Constitution is
without independent effect).
76. See Sherrard v. Hull, 53 Md. App. 553, 456 A.2d 59, offd, 296 Md. 189,
460 A.2d 601 (1983) (the right to petition is to be distinguished from the freedom
of speech). The Sherrardcourt placed special emphasis on the right to petition
because it is one of two "rights" found in the first amendment. Because free
speech is not a right, but a freedom, arguably the designation of the right to
petition was intentional. Therefore, the founding fathers may have considered
the right to petition to be a more important form of speech. Id. at 567, 456 A.2d
at 71 (citing with approval, Note, Maryland'sSummary Judgment Procedurein
New York Times Defamation Cases: Borkey v. Delia, 40 MI. L. REV. 638, 664
(1981)).
77. Sherrard,53 Md. at 573, 456 A.2d at 71.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 567, 456 A.2d at 67.
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The Inadequacy of the New York Times-Gertz Standard to
Safeguard the ConstitutionalRight to Petition
The principal reason given by courts for refusing to apply New
York Times malice to the petitioning process stems from the modern rules of pleading.80 Courts which have applied Noerr-Pennington to antitrust law and other areas declare that malice is too
easy to allege, and therefore even those who acted without malice
may be subject to the cost and inconvenience of defending that issue
in a lawsuit.8 ' One court reasoned that because of the modern rules
of pleading, the malice standard invited intimidation from all who
seek redress from the government.8 2 It is also unlikely that a motion to dismiss a complaint, which involves considerations of motive
and intent, will occur at the pretrial level.8 3 This would likewise
84
constitute an impermissible burden upon the right to petition.
Another element of the New York Times standard of malice
which necessarily burdens the right to petition is the ascertainment
of what constitutes a public figure.s5 In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,s6 the Supreme Court defined a public figure as a person who,
by reason of clear notoriety or fame, is within the public's attention.8 7 The Gertz definition, however, has proven to be imprecise.8 8
The question of public figure was left to state courts to decide. The
result is an ad hoc determination which is final in most instances
because the state court is deemed to be in a better position to judge
a person's standing in the community.8 9 State courts, more often
than not, apply their own law of defamation instead of the New
80. See Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1977)

(malice is easy to allege), cert denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1978).
81. Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 938 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Because malice is so easy to allege, a defendant will more than likely be obliged to face a full
blown trial. The spectre of having to persuade a jury of knowledge of the facts
so as to avoid reckless falsity will alone lead a citizen to reconsider lodging a
good faith petition. Stern, 547 F.2d at 1345.
82. Sierra Club, 349 F. Supp. at 937.
83. Stern, 547 F.2d at 1345. See also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v.
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 740-41 (1983) (regardless of how unmeritorious the suit, the
defendant will most likely have to incur substantial legal expenses).
84. Webb v. Fury, 282 SE.2d 28, 40 (W. Va. 1981).
85. New York Times malice was extended to public figures in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
86. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
87. Id. at 351. The Gertz Court also stated that there may be instances
where a person becomes an involuntary public figure who is thrust upon the
public through no fault of his own. Id. The instances of an involuntary public
figure, however, must be rare. Id. at 345.
88. Comment, The Public FigurePlaintiffv. The Nonmedia Defendant in
Defamation Law: Balancing the Respective Interests, 68 IOWA L. REV. 517, 519
(1983) (litigation of libel and slander claims has grown complex and expensive).
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 580A comment (c) (1977) (appellate courts show deference to lower courts whose opportunity to judge one's
exposure to the public is better).
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York Times standard of malice. 90 Therefore, the person exercising
his right to petition the government will not benefit from the narrow standard of New York Times malice.
A majority of states have realized, however, that communications to the government require a higher standard of protection
than that provided by state defamation laws or the New York Times
standard of malice. 91 These states afford a common law absolute
privilege against defamation suits when a person makes a statement
before a governmental body. 92 The purpose of the common law
privilege is to create an atmosphere whereby information may be
93
freely presented to the government.
The Common Law Legislative and JudicialPrivileges
The common law has paralleled the development of the NoerrPennington doctrine. The privilege was originally restricted to
statements made during a judicial proceeding. 94 Eventually, the
privilege was extended to quasi-judicial bodies, such as administrative agencies and executive commissions. 95 The privilege now applies to legislative proceedings as well. 96 Statements made to a
90. For an excellent discussion on the erratic nature of defamation and the
different and confusing standards applied by state law, see Comment, Defamation and State Constitutions: The Search for a State Based Standard After
Gertz, 19 WILLAMEE L.J. 665 (1983).
91. The states now use the common law privilege. The common law privilege in defamation is basically a conflict between two competing interests: the
desire of an individual to be free from defamatory attacks and the public's interest in "full and free disclosure of facts in the conduct of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial departments of Government." Mills v. Denny, 245 Iowa 584,
589, 43 N.W.2d 222, 225 (1954). The common law privilege is designed to ensure
that those who desire to present information to government will not be inhibited by the fear of a defamation suit. Webster v. Sun Co., 731 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
92. E.g., Webster, 731 F.2d at 1 (legislative privilege); Hoover v. Van Stone,
540 F. Supp. 1118 (D. Del. 1982) (judicial privilege); Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md.
188, 434 A.2d 547 (1981) (administrative hearings).
93. Hoover, 540 F. Supp. at 1122. The rationale of the privilege is that people will speak more freely and fearlessly when uninfluenced by the possibility
of a defamation suit. Stewart v. Fahey, 14 Ariz. App. 149, 150, 481 P.2d 519, 521
(1971). The protection of an individual interest safeguards the public's larger
interest in information. Toker v. Pollack, 44 N.Y.2d 211, 215, 376 N.E.2d 163,
167, 405 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1978).
94. In the judicial forum, adequate safeguards were thought to exist which
would assure that a fair proceeding would result. Originally, it was believed
that these safeguards were not present in other governmental forums. This
contention has since been relaxed. See Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 434 A.2d
547 (1981).
95. See, e.g., Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 150, 166 S.W.2d 909
(1942) (the privilege applies to proceedings before executive officials, boards, or
commissions which exercise quasi-judicial powers).
96. See, e.g., Bio/Basics Int'l Corp. v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 545 F.
Supp. 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (testimony before a congressional hearing held absolutely privileged).
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governmental body, preliminary to or during an investigatory proceeding, may be absolutely privileged. 97 This includes oral and
written statements 98 made voluntarily or under subpoena. 99
States that provide the absolute privilege recognize that the
privilege cannot apply in all instances. The statement must be relevant to the particular proceeding or the communicator will not be
immune from a defamation suit.1° ° While some courts have required that the statement be directly responsive and pertinent to
the question asked, 101 the modern approach to relevancy is much
more liberal. Modern relevancy simply requires some connection
10 2
between the statement and the subject matter of the proceeding.
The statement need not be material, and the question of truth or
falsity need not be germane, as long as the statement has some relevance to the investigation. 10 3 Defamatory statements which are
clearly unconnected to the subject matter, therefore, are not afforded protection. Doubts as to relevancy have usually been resolved m favor of the communicator. 1° 4
Although the relevancy rule may in some cases furnish immunity to those parties bent on defaming another, courts agree that
the need for parties to freely speak their minds outweighs any possible harm to another's reputation. 10 5 A governmental proceeding
is frequently an encounter where feelings are wounded and reputations are soiled. 1'6 One court recently stated that the remedy for a
97. See, e.g., Webster v. Sun Co., 731 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (written memorandum submitted to a congressional committee preliminary to an
investigation).

98. See, e.g., Webster, 731 F.2d at 1 (written memorandum); BiolBasics Int'l,
545 F. Supp. at 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (oral testimony).
99. There was once a requirement that the person giving the information be
under subpoena or the privilege would not apply. See Fiore v. Rogero, 144 So.2d
99 (Fla. App. 1962) (under subpoena). But see Jennings v. Cronin, 256 Pa.
Super. 398, 402 n.2, 389 A.2d 1183, 1185 n.2 (1978) (the requirement of a subpoena is irrelevant).
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588 (1973).
101. See Cooley v. Gaylon, 109 Tenn. 1, 70 S.W. 607 (1902) (statement which
is pertinent to the proceeding, or in direct response to a question presented, will
be afforded the privilege).
102. Hoover v. Van Stone, 540 F. Supp. 1118, 1121 (D. Del. 1982) (the requirement of relevancy is liberally construed). See also 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and
Slander § 237.
103. See Webster v. Sun Co., 731 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (some objective relevance required); Greenburg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 427 Pa. Super. 511, 235 A.2d 576
(1967) (we must ignore the truth or falsity of the statement), cert. denied, 392

U.S. 907 (1968).
104. Bio/Basics Int'l Corp. v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 545 F. Supp. 1106,
1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
105. Sierra Madre Dev., Inc. v. Via Entrada Town Ass'n, 20 Ariz. App. 550,

554, 514 P.2d 503, 507 (1973).
106. Id. at 554, 514 P.2d at 507 (quoting Bussewitz v. Wisconsin Teachers

Ass'n, 188 Wis. 121, 205 N.W. 808 (1925)).
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person defamed by a statement made to a governmental body is not
money, "but simply more speech - he has the right to tell his side of
'10 7
the story.
Whether a common law absolute privilege applies is more. difficult to resolve when a statement is made outside the protective environment of the governmental forum. These statements usually
occur preliminary to the governmental proceeding. Although the
privilege may apply to statements made preliminary to, or in the
course of a governmental proceeding, excessive publication may
render the privilege void. 10 8 Excessive publication usually takes
the form of statements communicated to the media'0 9 or to disinter110
ested third parties unconnected to the proceeding.
Statements Made Outside the Governmental Forum
The common law did not view the media as an interested party
to the proceeding."' Courts have generally held that a dissemination of information containing defamatory statements to the media
is not privileged.112 The dissemination of the defamatory statement, however, must be the primary fault of the party making the
statement. 113 If the media receives the information through its own
efforts, then no defamation action will lie against the party who
14
made the statement."
While the common law absolute privilege will generally not apply to communications made through the media, the Noerr-Pen115
nington doctrine may apply. The decision in Webb v. Fury
demonstrates how an unprivileged statement, not afforded a com107. Webster v. Sun Co., 561 F. Supp. 1184, 1189 (D.D.C. 1983), vacated and
remanded, 731 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
108. See generally 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 456 (1956) (unnecessary and
excessive publication will destroy the privilege).
109. See Asay v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 594 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1979) (no privilege when communicated to the media).
110. See Hoover v. Van Stone, 540 F. Supp. 1118 (D. Del. 1982) (disclosure to
customers and competitors); Williams v. Williams, 23 N.Y.2d 592, 246 N.E.2d
333, 298 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1969) (members of a defendant's trade).
111. Asay, 594 F.2d at 699.
112. Id. at 697. Accord Davis v. National Broadcasting Co., 320 F. Supp. 1070
(E.D. La. 1970) (when a statement is republished by the media, the defamed
person has a separate cause of action against both the original defamer and the
media company), affd, 447 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1971).
113. Asay, 594 F.2d at 699.
114. See Sullivan v. Birmingham, 11 Mass. App. 359, 416 N.E.2d 528 (1981).
Mere making of relevant statements on a privileged occasion, with the hope
that the media will make further publication, does not erase the immunity. The
defendant must have uttered the defamatory statement with an intent that it be
further communicated to the media. Id. at 363, 416 N.E.2d at 533. See also Johnson v. Cartwright, 355 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1966) (the media was a potential party to
the litigation).
115. 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981).
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mon law privilege, may, nonetheless, be immune from a defamation
action because it is protected by the first amendment right to petition. Webb involved an allegedly defamatory statement published
in a newsletter circulated to individuals interested in the preservation of clean streams in an area of West Virginia. 1 6 The newsletter
was part of the defendants' widespread campaign which included
petitioning the Environmental Protection Agency." i 7 Extending
the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine to the law of defamation, the court
granted absolute immunity." 8 The court reasoned that even
though the defendants had caused the statement to be published in
the newsletter, the activity was an attempt to muster public sentiment and was part of an otherwise legitimate petition designed to
influence governmental decisionmaking."19 The Webb court asserted that to hold otherwise would permit a chilling effect on the
20
freedom to exercise the right to petition.
116. Id. Webb was a private citizen and a principal managing agent of a nonprofit corporation designed to ensure that coal mining be conducted with full
regard for the rights of future generations. He was also a directing manager of
an organization which monitored the cleanliness of area waterways. Id. at 31.
Webb noticed that pollution was entering local waterways near the operations
of the allegedly defamed corporation's basis of operation. Webb brought a complaint to the Office of Surface Mining, United States Department of Interior,
and a request for an evidentiary hearing before the Environmental Protection
Agency. Id. Webb also caused a newsletter to be published which contained a
two paragraph story. The story, which never mentioned the defamed company,
nonetheless showed a map of the area and listed all permit numbers which indicated mining sites. All permits, moreover, were owned by the company in question. Id. at 33. Webb asserted that all petitions to the agencies and the
dissemination of information in the newsletter were absolutely privileged petitioning activities under the first amendment, and therefore no action for damages of any nature could be maintained. Id.
117. The petition to the Office of Surface Mining and the Environmental
Protection Agency were encouraged by the provisions of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act and provisions of the Clear Water Act. Id. at 3738.
118. Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 40. The court determined that the clear import of
the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine was to protect those who genuinely petition government for redress of grievances. Id. at 43.
119. Id. at 42.
120. Id. The court went on to note that the newsletter added nothing to the
complaint, which was not otherwise disseminated to the governmental agencies,
and that it did not come within the "sham" exception. Id. For other cases
which mention dissemination to third persons and the media as a means to muster public sentiment, see Missouri v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d
1301 (8th Cir.) (use of a boycott privileged as an attempt to influence the ratification of E.R.A.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); Feminist Women's Health
Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978) (boycotting will not dismiss the immunity of petitioning activity); Mark Aero, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 580 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1978) (a publicity campaign involving the media
was part of a genuine attempt to influence governmental action); Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Board of Culinary
Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976) (allegations including the dissemination
of malicious and false statements through the media designed to sway sentiment, and illegal picketing, dismissed as insufficient to warrant interference
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The common law absolute privilege and the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine are similar, yet distinct, concepts.' 2 ' Both concepts find
their basis in the belief that every person should have free access to
the governmental process, unhindered by the fear of costly litigation.12 2 The public will benefit if petitioners and witnesses are not
deterred by such apprehension. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
however, is much broader in scope than the common law privilege,
and even has constitutional origins. 123 Extending the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to the law of defamation, therefore, as put forth in
two recent decisions, 124 rests on sound constitutional grounds.
EXTENDING Noerr-PenningtonTO THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
i s
Although the courts in Sherrardv. Hull" and Webb v. Fury26
reviewed the evolution of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, the decisions were primarily based on the first amendment right to petition.
It was the role of government which persuaded these courts to apply an absolute privilege, indefeasible of malice.127 In a representative government the people must be able to freely and candidly
inform the government of actual or perceived wrongs12 The Sherrard and Webb courts were alarmed by the apparent ease in which
malice can be pleaded, and the effect it would have on the right to
i 9
petition.1
The prospect of litigation, they argued, would discour30
age citizens from making good faith petitions.

The chilling effect of a defamation suit was emphasized in the
Webb opinion. In Webb, the court asserted that the defendant's petitioning activity was precisely the type of communication that the
with activity protected by the first amendment), cerL denied, 430 U.S. 940
(1977). Cf. Mid-Texas Communications v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 615 F.2d
1372 (5th Cir. 1980) (private actions not directed at any governmental body and
not designed to sway public sentiment was not privileged). The Webb court also
noted that the information disseminated to the media and to the agencies was
"far less noxious than any of those 'big lies' which the Court dealt with in Noerr." 282 S.E. at 42-43.
121. See generally Bass v. Rohr, 57 Md. App. 609, 471 A.2d 752 (1984) (two
privileges apply here: one is of a constitutional nature and the other has
evolved from the law of libel and slander).
122. See generally Id. (there exists a need to present information without the
fear of subsequent harassment from a defamation suit).
123. Id. at 65, 471 A.2d at 755.
124. See Sherrard v. Hull, 53 Md. App. 553, 456 A.2d 59 (1983); Webb v. Fury,
282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981).
125. 53 Md. App. 553, 456 A.2d 59 (1983).
126. 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981).
127. Sherrard,53 Md. App. at 574, 456 A.2d at 71; Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 38-9.
128. Sherrard,53 Md. App. at 573, 456 A.2d at 71.
129. Sherrard,53 Md. App. at 567, 456 A.2d at 67; Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 40.
130. See generally Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (a
malice standard invites intimidation of all who honestly seek to petition for redress of grievances).
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right to petition intended to foster.' 3 ' The defendant was a concerned citizen who desired clean streams. Yet, when he informed
the government of wrongs committed by an alleged polluter, the
accused claimed defamation. The petitioner, moreover, was an individual of ordinary means, while the accused was a well-financed
corporation. 132 Even the dissent recognized that in cases like Webb
the potential for chilling genuine petitions to the government, when
133
there is anything less than absolute immunity, is enormous.
In Sherrard, the petitioner addressed a local legislative hearing. 134 One of the matters presented to the legislature concerned a
zoning designation near the petitioner's farm. The petitioner gave
her views on the subject, but questioned a commissioner who had
voted in favor of a change in zoning on how much money it had cost
to get him to vote for the change. 135 The person who brought the
rezoning proposal sued for defamation. As in Webb, the Sherrard
court noted that the petitioning activity was the type the first
amendment covered.1ss The court also noted that the petitioner
was encouraged to speak out at the hearing. 137 The court held that
as long as the principal purpose of a petition is to obtain a favorable
governmental response, no defamation action would lie.' 3 8 In
weighing the individual's desire to be free from a defamation suit
against the need of the government to receive information enabling
it to better serve the needs of the public, the Sherrard court held
that the latter must prevail. 139
Both courts underscored their opinions with the need to maintain a system of government that encourages a free exchange of
competing social and economic interests. In Webb, the court observed that both parties had ample opportunity to participate in the
petitioning process and that each party had an opportunity to speak
on the issue. 14° The Webb court was careful to caution, however,
that if people cannot communicate their views to the government,
our democratic system, designed to do the will of the people, would
131. Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 37. The petitioning activity was on "all fours" with

the conduct held to be protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in Noerr
and its progeny. Id.
132. Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 46 (Neely, J., dissenting).
133. Id. The dissent contended that an absolute privilege should not be the
first remedy put forth. Instead, the rules of pleading should be made rigid in

petitioning cases. Id. at 47.
134. Sherrard,53 Md. App. at 574, 456 A.2d at 71.

135. Id. at 555, 456 A.2d at 61. Although the court noted that falsehoods have
never been protected for their own sake, to not apply an absolute privilege
would chill the right to petition. Id. at 571, 456 A.2d at 69.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 572, 456 A.2d at 70.
Id.
Id. at 566, 456 A.2d at 67.
Id. at 567, 456 A.2d at 67.
Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 39.
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fail.141 In Sherrard, the court outlined a method which would not
only safeguard the right to petition, but would also better protect an
142
individual's desire to be free from defamation.
Combining Common Law Relevance with the Sham Exception
In Sherrard,the court reasserted the proposition that a petition
must be recognized as a genuine effort to influence governmental
decisionmaking, and not just a sham designed to harm an individual. 143 Unlike the other Noerr-Penningtondecisions, however, the
Sherrardcourt imposed the requirement that the allegedly defamatory statement must be relevant to the overall proceeding.'" In order to satisfy the relevancy requirement the statement must have
some objective reference to the subject matter of the petitioning activity. 1 45 If the overall petition is a sham, or the particular statement irrelevant, then no immunity applies. 146 The court reasoned
that the relevancy requirement was necessary to further protect the
147
interests of the allegedly defamed party.
Subsequent to the Sherrard decision, the court in Bass v.
Rohr 148 applied the sham and relevancy requirements to a petition
made to a Home Improvement Commission. The court determined
that the allegedly defamatory statements were relevant to the complaints filed to the commission, and thus absolute immunity applied.149 The Bass court further ordered the complainant to pay all
so
costs.'
141. Id. at 43. The United States appeared as amicus in Webb. The United
States urged the Webb court to apply an absolute immunity for citizens who are
sued because of petitioning activity intended to influence governmental decisionmaking. A conditional privilege would be insufficient, resulting in a chill
on the exercise of the first amendment right to petition. Reply Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981).
142. For a discussion of this method, see infra notes 143-150 and accompanying text.
143. Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 566, 456 A.2d at 67. For a discussion of the
sham exception, see supra note 49-64 and accompanying text.
144. Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 574, 456 A.2d at 71. The relevancy requirement is substantially similar to the modem relevancy requirement imposed by
the common law privileges. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
145. Sherrard, 53 Md. App. at 574, 456 A.2d at 71.
146. Id.
147. Id. The relevancy requirement was not part of Maryland's common law
privilege. The Sherrard court, however, incorporated the requirement because

of competing interests involved and the broadness of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine. Id.
148. 57 Md. App. 609, 471 A.2d 752 (1984).
149. Id. at 618, 471 A.2d at 757.
150. Id. at 620, 471 A.2d at 758.
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CONCLUSION

While relevancy must be decided on a case-by-case basis, it will
effectively serve to rid the petitioning process of those individuals
who might otherwise hide behind the broad sham exception. For
instance, a statement concerning a person's personal life has no
place in a petition which relates to the pollution of the environment
or the failure to properly construct a home. The incorporation of
relevancy deserves attention from courts which in the future will
decide whether to apply Noerr-Pennington to the law of
defamation.
In light of the evolution of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, its
extension to the law of defamation is reasonable and logical.
Whether the threat of litigation comes from an antitrust suit or an
action for defamation, the harm upon the right to petition remains
the same. Unintentional verbal and written accusations can easily
be exploited by the allegedly defamed person as a means of revenge.
The response should not be a defamation suit, but more speech.
Adam Kreuzer

